| Applicant name | DÁNIEL KARSAI |
| Applicant type | natural person |
| Number of applicants | 1 |
| Country | Hungary |
| Application no. | 32312/23 |
| Date | 13/06/2024 |
| Judges | Alena Poláčková, President, Marko Bošnjak, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Gilberto Felici, Ivana Jelić, Erik Wennerström, Raffaele Sabato |
| Institution | Court |
| Type | Judgment |
| Outcome Art. 8 | No violation |
| Reason | Fair balance |
| Type of privacy | Private life |
| Keywords | Assisted dying |
| Facts of the case | he applicant complained about the fact that it was not possible for him, under Hungarian law, to end his life with assistance, in breach of his right to private life, enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention |
| Analysis | The Court therefore considers that the present complaint falls to be examined as concerning an aspect of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life within the meaning of Article 8. As regards the question whether this Article goes so far as to require the respondent State to allow or provide the applicant a certain form of PAD, this is a matter which can be resolved only through an examination on the merits, with due regard to the conflicting considerations and the State’s margin of appreciation. Having regard to the foregoing the Court finds that the complaint is compatible ratione materiae with the Convention. Noting that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention, the Court declares it admissible. The Court emphasises that the issue it has been asked to determine in the present case is not whether a different policy – such as one providing for PAD – might have been acceptable, but whether in striking the particular balance that they did between the competing interests, the Hungarian authorities remained within their considerable margin of appreciation. Against the above background, the Court does not find that the Hungarian authorities overstepped that margin. It thus follows that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. That being said, the Court would reiterate that the Convention has to be interpreted and applied in the light of present-day conditions. The need for appropriate legal measures should therefore be kept under review, having regard to the developments in European societies and in the international standards on medical ethics in this sensitive domain The applicant complained that he was subjected to discrimination because the law did not provide him with an option to hasten his death, although it did provide such an option to terminally ill patients who were dependent on life-sustaining treatment. He relied on Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. The Court notes that the right to refuse or request discontinuation of unwanted medical treatment is inherently connected to the right to free and informed consent to medical intervention, which is widely recognised and endorsed by the medical profession, and is also laid down in the Oviedo Convention. This point has also been consistently reiterated by the Court with regard to situations where the refusal to accept a particular treatment might lead to a fatal outcome. It must be acknowledged that the refusal or withdrawal of treatment in end-of-life situations is the subject of particular consideration or regulation because of the need to safeguard, inter alia, the right to life; however, such refusal or withdrawal is intrinsically linked to the right to free and informed consent, rather than to a right to be assisted in dying. The Court further notes that it has found it justified for Hungary to maintain an absolute ban on assisted suicide, on account, among other aspects, of the risks of abuse involved in the provision of PAD, which may extend beyond those involved in RWI; the potential broader social implications of PAD; the policy choices involved in its provision; and the considerable margin of appreciation afforded to the States in this respect . Similar cogent reasons exist under Article 14 for justifying the allegedly different treatment of those terminally ill patients who are dependent on life-sustaining treatment and those patients who are not, and who in consequence cannot hasten their death by refusing such treatment. The Court would note in this connection that, in contrast to the situation with regard to PAD, the majority of the member States allow RWI. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the right to refuse or withdraw consent to interventions in the health field is recognised also in the Oviedo Convention, which, in contrast, does not safeguard any interests with regard to PAD. The Court therefore considers that the alleged difference in treatment of the aforementioned two groups of terminally ill patients is objectively and reasonably justified. |
| Other Article violation? | no violation 8+14 |
| Damage awarded | – |
| Documents | Judgment |