| Applicant name | NURCAN BAYRAKTAR |
| Applicant type | Natural person |
| Number of applicants | 1 |
| Country | Turkey |
| Application no. | 27094/20 |
| Date | 27/06/2023 |
| Judges | Arnfinn Bårdsen, président, Jovan Ilievski, Pauliine Koskelo, Saadet Yüksel, Lorraine Schembri Orland, Frédéric Krenc, Davor Derenčinović |
| Institution | Court |
| Type | Judgment |
| Outcome Art. 8 | Violation |
| Reason | Not necessary (health and morals; rights and freedoms) |
| Type of privacy | Private life |
| Keywords | Right to remarry; annum luctus; discrimination |
| Facts of the case | The present application concerns the refusal by the national authorities to the applicant’s request that she be exempted, without undergoing a medical examination to determine whether she was pregnant, from the period of 300 days provided for by the article 132 of the civil code for divorced women. Relying on Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the Convention, the applicant alleges that the obligation imposed on divorced women to respect a period of 300 days unless they prove that they are not pregnant constitutes discrimination and a violation of their rights to privacy and marriage. |
| Analysis | The Turkish law installed a period after which a divorced women is allowed to remarry, or requires medical proof that she is not pregnant. The Turkish government stresses that the applicant cannot claim to be a victim and if so, that harm done to her personally does not meet the de minimis standard. The ECtHR reiterates that the Convention does not allow actio popularis or in abstracto claims, but requires the applicant to demonstrate personal harm. It acknowledges that the applicant had no concrete plans to remarry, but finds that the very fact that the applicant belonged to the group to which the legal regime applied was sufficient for her to be considered a victim. As the the de minimis rule, the Court merely finds that the effects of the legal regime should not be underestimated. Perhaps the most remarkable is that the ECtHR starts its analysis not with Article 12 ECHR, under which provision the case seems to fall intuitively, but with Article 8 ECHR, as the Court finds that marriage is one of the most intimate aspects of a person’s private life. The Court accepts that the interference had a legal basis and that the law served one of the interests from the list of Article 8 paragraph 2, without making clear which one, but presumably protecting the health and morals and the rights and freedoms of others. It reiterates that in principle, domestic authorities are best placed to assess questions over morality, taking account of national and regional sentiments, but also stresses that two points can limit the margin of appreciation: the intimate character of the interference and the existence of a European consensus that differs from the national consensus. The Court especially homes in on the former point and finds the regime to be disproportionate and unnecessary. A violation of Article 8 ECHR is found. The Court then turns to Article 12+14 ECHR. It is clear that the regime only applied to women, because only women can get pregnant; the legal regime wanted to avoid confusion over bloodlines (eg preventing people unknowingly to have intercourse with a relative) and guarantee unborn children’s right to know the identity of their parents. But does this distinction between man and women have an objective and reasonable justification? No, the Court finds: ‘De l’avis de la Cour, les stéréotypes sexistes sur lesquels le tribunal aux affaires familiales s’est appuyé en l’espèce pour rejeter la demande de la requérante, tels que l’idée que les femmes auraient un devoir envers la société en raison de leur rôle potentiel de mères et de leur capacité de donner naissance, constituent un obstacle sérieux à la réalisation d’une véritable égalité matérielle entre les sexes, qui, comme cela a déjà été dit, est l’un des objectifs majeurs des États membres du Conseil de l’Europe . En outre, de telles considérations de la part des autorités nationales semblent également être en contradiction avec les normes internationales pertinentes en matière d’égalité entre les sexes. Par conséquent, la Cour conclut que l’obligation faite aux femmes divorcées, en raison de la possibilité d’une grossesse, de respecter un délai de viduité de 300 jours à moins qu’elles ne prouvent par un examen médical qu’elles ne sont pas enceintes s’analyse en une discrimination directe fondée sur le sexe, qui ne peut être justifiée par le but de prévenir des incertitudes quant à la filiation d’un éventuel enfant à naître. À la lumière de ce qui précède, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, la Cour estime que la différence de traitement à laquelle la requérante a été soumise au motif de son sexe n’était ni objectivement justifiée ni nécessaire. (§89-91)’ Consequently, it finds a violation of ARticle 12+14 ECHR. |
| Other Article violation? | Yes, Article 12+14 ECHR; No violation Article 6 ECHR |
| Damage awarded | Said, a) that the respondent State must pay to the applicant, for costs and expenses, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, 564 .01 EUR (five hundred and sixty-four euros and one cent), plus any amount which may be payable by the applicant as tax on this sum, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of regulations; b) that from the expiry of the said period until payment, these amounts will be subject to simple interest at a rate equal to that of the marginal lending facility of the European Central Bank applicable during this period, increased by three percentage points; |
| Documents | Judgment |